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 On June 5, 2009, over 200 attorneys, reporters, and spectators 
filed into the courthouse of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, eager to hear the court’s decision on Chrysler’s impeding bank-
ruptcy.1  After months of losses, billions of dollars in bailout funding, 
and a failed attempt at a merger, Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy and agreed to sell all of its operating assets to “New Chrysler,” 
led by Italy’s Fiat.2  Among those anxiously awaiting the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion were representatives of Indiana’s Police Pension Trust, 
the Teachers Retirement Fund, and the Major Moves Construction 
Fund (collectively, “Pensioners”), who had appealed the bankruptcy 
court’s approval of the plan.  If the sale moved forward, the Pension-
ers stood to receive only twenty-nine cents on the dollar for invest-
ments purchased less than a year earlier for forty-three cents on the 
dollar.3  After only “an hour and [a] half of oral argument and a 10-
minute recess,” the court ruled directly from the bench and affirmed 
the sale.4  Five days later, the sale was closed.5  Almost instantly, the 
 
1 See Noeleen G. Walder, Ruling in Chrysler Bankruptcy Upholds Sale of Assets to Fiat, 
N.Y. L.J., June 8, 2009, at 1. 
2 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, Ind. State 
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009); see also Walder, su-
pra note 1 (summarizing the procedural history of the bankruptcy proceedings). 
3 Walder, supra note 1. 
4 Id.; see also In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111 (detailing the bankruptcy proceedings of 
June 5, 2009).  Simultaneously, the Second Circuit approved a short stay pending Su-
preme Court review.  Id. at 112.  However, the Supreme Court ultimately declined to 
extend the stay.  Id.  
5 In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 112.  On December 14, 2009, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari for an appeal from the Indiana Petitioners.  In its four-sentence de-
cision, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit, 
instructing the court to “dismiss the appeal as moot.”  Ind. State Police Pension Trust, 130 
S. Ct. at 1015.  These actions seem “mysterious,” but it is likely the Court disagreed 
with the lower court’s opinion, and thus granted certiorari, but then was forced to 
dismiss the appeal because the sale had closed and the matter was therefore “moot.”  
See Steve Jakubowski, US Supreme Court Drops Bombshell “Summary Disposition” Vacating 2d 
Circuit’s Chrysler Decision, BANKR. LITIG. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2009), http:// 
www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/archives/241190-print.html (follow “December 14, 
2009”).  By citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), the Court prevented 
the Second Circuit’s decision from becoming binding precedent.  See Jakubowski, supra 
(“‘Our supervisory power over the judgments of the lower federal courts is a broad 
one. . . . [I]t is commonly utilized in precisely this situation to prevent a judgment, un-
reviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences.’” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40-41)).   
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loss of the American icon quickly became a hallmark of “the worst re-
cession since the Great Depression.”6 
One of the most startling aspects of the decision was the speed at 
which it occurred.  As in most bankruptcy cases, the sense of urgency 
surrounding the proceedings had to be weighed against the opportuni-
ty for meaningful review.7  In an attempt to protect both interests, the 
circuit court certified the Pensioners’ motion for a stay and direct ap-
peal, foregoing discussion in the district court entirely.  Over the course 
of only five days, the matter was concluded in the bankruptcy court and 
affirmed by the court of appeals, and five days later, the sale was closed.8 
During this time of financial uncertainty, it is critical that decision-
makers develop procedures to guarantee efficient resolutions while 
also crafting predictable precedent to guide and govern bankruptcy 
law.  In re Chrysler illustrates, however, that the realities of bankruptcy 
make it particularly difficult to strike the appropriate balance between 
speed and the opportunity for meaningful review.  In an effort to 
streamline an often cumbersome bankruptcy appellate process, Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),9 which provided for, among other things, 
direct appeals from bankruptcy courts to the courts of appeals.10  Ac-
cording to a comprehensive survey of the case law, the courts of ap-
peals have largely used 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) as Congress envisioned, 
granting direct appeals to resolve outstanding or particularly thorny 
issues of bankruptcy law.11  This Comment argues that while 
§ 158(d)(2) creates an important mechanism for expediting bank-
ruptcy appeals, the provision unintentionally establishes a loophole 
 
6 Andrew Sum et al., Ctr. for Labor Mkt. Studies, Ne. Univ., The Economic Reces-
sion of 2007–2009:  A Comparative Perspective on Its Duration and the Severity of Its 
Labor Market Impacts 1 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (quoting President 
Obama), available at http://www.clms.neu.edu/publication/documents/Economic_ 
Recession_of_20072009.pdf. 
7 It was estimated that Chrysler was “hemorrhaging” close to $100 million a day.  
Walder, supra note 1. 
8 On June 1, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
authorized the sale of Chrysler.  The very next day, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
certified the Pensioners’ motion for a stay and a direct appeal.  On June 5, 2009, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court.  In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111.  By June 
10, 2009, the sale was closed.  Id. at 112. 
9 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
10 BAPCPA § 1233, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2006). 
11 See Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the New 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145, 146 (2010) (“[T]he new direct appeal process is 
being used for the purposes intended by those who advocated for its adoption . . . .”). 
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thwarting an individual’s right to Article III review and Congress’s 
long-term intent to create predictable precedent.  As § 158(d)(2) is 
currently written, the lower court (the bankruptcy court or district 
court) may certify a matter for direct appeal while denying the party’s 
related motion for a stay pending that appeal.  As a result, the case 
could move forward and the appellant could be denied review—even 
though the lower court has acknowledged that at least one issue de-
serves review by a court that can create binding precedent—because it 
would be “inequitable” to grant relief according to the doctrine of 
equitable mootness.12  To correct these vulnerabilities, decisionmakers 
should consider the authority of the lower courts to grant or deny 
stays pending direct appeals in light of the potential threat of equita-
ble mootness.  Although granting a stay pending appeal may delay 
bankruptcy proceedings for the individual in the short term, long-
term interests weigh heavily in favor of ensuring review by an Article 
III court capable of crafting binding precedent. 
Though this Comment will focus on a specific bankruptcy proce-
dure, the problems direct appeals create highlight a tension inherent 
in bankruptcy law:  the need to balance practical considerations such 
as speed, efficiency, and specialized review, with constitutional values, 
including fairness, due process, and the right to an appeal.  Thus, ex-
amining the use of § 158(d)(2) and the difficulties that have arisen 
over the past five years provides not only an overview of bankruptcy 
direct appeals, but also valuable insights for bankruptcy procedure in 
general.  As the Appellate Rules Committee13 and the Advisory Com-
 
12 The doctrine of equitable mootness allows an appellate court to deny an otherwise 
legitimate review of an appeal if an order (often a reorganization plan) has progressed to 
the point where granting relief would be inequitable or impractical.  See Manges v. Seat-
tle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In [bankrupt-
cy proceedings], ‘mootness’ is not an Article III inquiry as to whether a live controversy is 
presented; rather, it is a recognition by the appellate courts that there is a point beyond 
which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions.”); Ryan M. 
Murphy, Equitable Mootness Should Be Used as a Scalpel Rather than an Axe in Bankruptcy Ap-
peals, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 33, 33 (2010) (“The equitable mootness doctrine 
constitutes a judicial anomaly in that it permits a federal court to voluntary [sic] refrain 
from exercising jurisdiction over an appeal that is indisputably ripe for adjudication 
simply on the ground that granting relief would be ‘inequitable.’”). 
13 The authority of the Appellate Rules Committee is set forth in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).  See generally James C. Duff, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, A Summary for the Bench and Bar, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/ 
SummaryBenchBar.aspx (providing a brief summary of the workings of the Rules Advi-
sory Committees). 
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mittee on Bankruptcy Rules14 prepare to amend direct appeals in the 
near future, these insights should guide any changes to ensure that 
the urgency of an individual bankruptcy proceeding is appropriately 
considered against the long-term need for precedent in an unpredict-
able area of the law. 
Part I of this Comment will discuss bankruptcy appellate proce-
dure, as well as the inherent tension between efficiency and the right 
to review in bankruptcy law.  Part II describes the motivations behind 
direct appeals, including Congress’s desire to streamline bankruptcy 
appellate procedures and to create a predictable body of precedent.  
Part III reviews the provisions of § 158(d)(2), focusing in particular 
upon the discretion of a court of appeals to accept or deny a direct 
appeal as well as the freedom of the lower court (bankruptcy or dis-
trict court) to grant or deny a stay pending that appeal.  Part IV com-
pares § 158(d)(2) with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a provision governing 
immediate appeals of interlocutory decisions that many circuit courts 
have relied upon to guide the application of direct appeals in bank-
ruptcy.  Part V examines circuit courts’ use of § 158(d)(2) over the 
past five years, including a discussion of when courts have chosen to 
authorize direct appeals.  Part VI analyzes the role of the lower courts, 
including how the choice to grant or deny a stay pending appeal has 
affected the long-term impact of direct appeals in light of the doctrine 
of equitable mootness.  Part VII provides a case study of an instance in 
which a lower court granted the certification for direct appeal but de-
nied the stay, illustrating the tension between direct appeals and the 
equitable mootness doctrine, as well as a weakness in the current 
drafting of § 158(d)(2) that may undermine Congress’s objectives.  
Finally, Part VIII provides recommendations regarding how rule-
makers and bankruptcy practitioners should reconsider the relation-
ship between direct appeals and stays to protect the long-term aims of 
§ 158(d)(2).  In particular, this Comment argues that if a lower court 
deems a matter worthy of direct appeal, the relevant court of appeals 
should consider whether or not a stay should be granted in concert with 
the direct appeal to guarantee review by an Article III court. 
 
14 The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules is currently conducting a “com-
prehensive revision of the bankruptcy appellate rules (Part VIII of the Bankruptcy 
Rules)” and discussing potential changes.  Memorandum from Honorable Laura Tay-
lor Swain, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, to Honorable Lee H. Rosen-
thal, Chair of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Dec. 7, 2009) 
(on file with author).  
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I.  BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE LAW:  PAST CONSIDERATIONS AND CURRENT 
CHALLENGES 
Bankruptcy is a unique area of the law.  Its highly technical and 
specialized nature, as well as the real-world urgency of bankruptcy 
proceedings, has forced decisionmakers to alter the rules of appellate 
procedure to meet the needs of the field.15  For example, the flexible 
finality standard—a unique component of bankruptcy law—allows 
parties to appeal a discrete issue immediately to the higher court (ei-
ther to the district court or, in the case of a direct appeal, to the cir-
cuit court).16  Yet, the realities that have driven reform have also made 
finding the correct balance between speed and meaningful review 
particularly difficult.  In such a complex area of the law, context is ne-
 
15 See Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals:  A Further Reply to Professor Cheme-
rinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 144 (1997) (“Bankruptcy matters proceed at a pace en-
tirely different from most of the litigation that comes before district courts.  Many of 
the questions that arise must be dealt with immediately if the ongoing businesses are to 
be kept operating.”); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystals, Mud, BAPCPA, and the Structure of 
Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 71 MO. L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2006) (“Speed of resolution is 
especially important in the bankruptcy context, where the automatic stay gives particu-
lar significance to the familiar adage . . . that time is money.”). 
16 See DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 14.2, at 342 (5th ed. 
2007) (“The flexible finality rule is best understood in terms of whether the order 
from which appeal is sought constitutes a final determination of a discrete dispute 
within the bankruptcy.  If it does, the order is appealable.”); Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy 
Appeals, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 253 (1991) (noting that in the “classic standard 
of finality, a judgment that ‘ends the litigation . . . and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment,’ is ill-suited to bankruptcy.  No one advocates relegating 
all appeals until after the confirmation of a plan or disposition of a . . . case.” (altera-
tion in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 
(1945))); see also Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., 
Inc.), 439 F.3d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Any inefficiencies resulting from separate ap-
peals . . . are outweighed by the need for finality.”). 
 Yet this flexible standard creates its own problems and uncertainty.  First, scholars 
and judges continue to debate the scope of the flexible finality standard.  As Chief 
Judge Edith Jones noted in her article on bankruptcy appeals, it is beyond agreement 
that in flexibility necessarily “lies a bewildering array of decisions on finality.”  Jones, 
supra, at 253.  In recognition of the uncertainty the flexible finality standard creates, cir-
cuit courts have debated whether they should apply the certification standard of Rule 
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  KNIBB, supra, § 14.2, at 346.  Second, be-
cause bankruptcy law is composed of many discrete parts, each potentially altering the 
outcome of the proceedings, earlier decisions may affect ones that come later in the 
process.  See, e.g., In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1043-44 (holding that the substantial consum-
mation of the bankruptcy plan rendered appeal of an earlier confirmation order moot).  
In fact, the doctrine of equitable mootness might prevent a party from bringing an ap-
peal altogether.  Therefore, the flexible finality doctrine, while necessary to meet the 
practical considerations of bankruptcy proceedings, makes it difficult to create binding 
precedent because important questions of law may be rendered moot before the appel-
late court is able to address them. 
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cessary to appreciate the impetus for BAPCPA, as well as some of the 
current challenges facing bankruptcy appellate procedure. 
Bankruptcy law in the United States has been shaped by compet-
ing concerns:  practical considerations (such as speed, efficiency, and 
specialized review) and constitutional values (including fairness, due 
process, and the right to an appeal).  At the heart of this debate is the 
origin of bankruptcy law itself.  Unlike Article III courts, which were 
created as a separate branch of government to protect litigants’ rights, 
Congress established bankruptcy courts under Article I of the Consti-
tution.17  Due to bankruptcy courts’ constitutional foundations, scho-
lars have argued that the legitimacy of bankruptcy appeals depends 
upon proper review by an Article III court.18  The possibility of such 
review, however, may be frustrated by the bankruptcy courts’ authority 
to determine whether to grant a stay pending appeal.  By refusing to 
grant a stay, a bankruptcy court affects the “application of the equita-
ble mootness doctrine” and “allow[s] an Article I court to impact the 
power of review reserved strictly for an Article III court.”19  Part VI dis-
cuss the interplay between the failure to grant stays and the doctrine 
of equitable mootness. 
The debate regarding the constitutionality of bankruptcy courts 
came to a head in 1982, when a plurality of the Supreme Court held 
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line that Congress 
did not have the power to vest “the essential attributes of judicial pow-
er” reserved for Article III courts in an Article I court.20  In its analysis, 
the Court was concerned with protecting the independence of the ju-
diciary and maintaining the system of checks and balances.21  The 
Court recognized that powerful Article I courts created by Congress 
could threaten the right of litigants to “‘have claims decided by judges 
who are free from potential domination by other branches of gov-
ernment.’”22  To prevent uncertainty from undermining bankruptcy 
 
17 Article I of the Constitution provides Congress with the power “to estab-
lish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
18 See Katelyn Knight, Comment, Equitable Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 253, 255 (2009) (noting that denying review by an Article III court “un-
dermines the protections afforded by separation of powers in government”). 
19 Murphy, supra note 12, at 45. 
20 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).  The 
result in the case was reached because two additional Justices concurred in the judgment. 
21 See id. at 58 (considering in its analysis that Article III is “an inseparable element 
of the constitutional system of checks and balances”). 
22 Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)). 
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proceedings in the wake of its opinion, the Supreme Court voluntarily 
stayed its own decision for five months to allow Congress to draft new 
bankruptcy legislation.23  More than two years later, Congress passed 
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, which 
largely established the system as it functions today.24 
Currently, bankruptcy courts act as specialized “units” of the dis-
trict courts.  While the district courts theoretically retain original ju-
risdiction, most districts have a standing order that automatically re-
fers bankruptcy proceedings to the bankruptcy courts.25  Bankruptcy 
judges have the authority to make the initial determination on “core” 
matters, such as stays, creditors’ claims, and other issues “historically” 
relegated to the bankruptcy court.26  District courts may hear appeals 
from final judgments, orders, and decrees by bankruptcy judges.27  
District courts may also adjudicate interlocutory orders and decrees 
“with leave of the court.”28  In certain jurisdictions, a bankruptcy ap-
pellate panel (BAP),29 instead of the district court, may exercise juris-
 
23 Id. at 88. 
24 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.).  
Note, however, that appellate review of bankruptcy decisions continued to present 
constitutional challenges.  Even after 1984, bankruptcy courts had the authority to 
dismiss cases without an appeal to an Article III court.  Knight, supra note 18, at 258 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988) (amended 1990)).  In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that this practice was unconstitutional.  See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta 
Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 536 (11th Cir. 1991).  
The court came to this conclusion by determining that the power to dismiss a case 
vested an Article III authority in an Article I court.  Id. at 538. 
25 See Knight, supra note 18, at 258 (“Every district court in the United States ex-
cept the District of Delaware has a standing order to refer bankruptcy cases to its bank-
ruptcy division.”). 
26 KNIBB, supra note 16, § 14.1, at 338.  Until 1978, bankruptcy judges could adju-
dicate only certain “core” matters.  Knight, supra note 18, at 256 n.31.  In 1978, Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.), which allowed bankruptcy courts 
to hear almost all matters that arose during a bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. at 256-57.  It 
was this expansion of powers that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in North-
ern Pipeline.  Today, for noncore proceedings, bankruptcy judges are permitted to 
make only recommendations to the district court, which exercises original jurisdiction 
in these matters.  KNIBB, supra note 16, at § 14.1. 
27 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
28 Id. § 158(a)(3). 
29 Bankruptcy Appellate Panels were established by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.  
§ 160, 92 Stat. at 2659 (amended 1984).  BAPs, like bankruptcy courts, are Article I 
courts that exercise jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals.  Though district courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over the appeals, most appeals are automatically routed to the 
“nontenured appellate panels” and “[c]onsent . . . is inferred from a party’s failure to 
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diction over appeals.30  From the district court or the BAP, an appeal 
may then be taken to the appropriate court of appeals.  While this 
two-tiered structure remains for many bankruptcy litigants today, 
Congress attempted to remedy the uncertainty and sluggishness of the 
process in 2005 with the BAPCPA provision for direct appeals.31 
II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  BAPCPA AND DIRECT APPEALS 
Congress sought to address some of the concerns raised by the 
two-tiered bankruptcy appellate structure with the passage of  
BAPCPA.32  BAPCPA includes a provision allowing direct appeals from 
the bankruptcy courts to the courts of appeals.  This option, which was 
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), allows a party to appeal directly to 
the relevant court of appeals if the party receives certification from 
the bankruptcy court or district court and the court of appeals (the 
appropriate Article III court) grants review.33 
With BAPCPA, Congress attempted to facilitate the efficient reso-
lution of bankruptcy appeals and minimize uncertainty.34  In the two-
tiered system (with the district court or BAP providing the first layer of 
appellate review and the circuit court the second), the time and cost 
required of creditors and debtors provided significant disincentives to 
pursuing bankruptcy appeals.35  In addition to time and cost, Congress 
 
insist timely on Article III court review.”  Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrat-
ing Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 683 (2009). 
30 The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have established BAPs. 6 
COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 117.02[2], at 117 n.24 (Asa S. Herzog & Law-
rence P. King eds., 2010). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
32 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
33 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). 
34 See Don Beskrone & Ricardo Palacio, Interlocutory Direct Appeals Under BAPCPA:  
Questionable Role of the Bankruptcy Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2007, at 10, 10 
(“The legislative intent behind the new statute, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 
was to facilitate the efficient resolution of bankruptcy appeals and reduce attendant 
cost and delay.”). 
35 See NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY:  THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 754 
(1997) (“Under the current system, every bankruptcy appeal is an expensive excursion 
for both debtor and creditor who must work through two layers of appeals for a final 
resolution of their disputes.”); see also Jones, supra note 16, at 246 (“The average bank-
ruptcy practitioner will not often find himself participating in an appeal of a bankrupt-
cy court’s decision.  The disincentives to appeal—the cost, the inevitable delay, the 
possibility of jurisdictional dismissals that would accomplish nothing—are considera-
ble.”); cf. News Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Asks 
Congress to Address Areas of Concern in Bankruptcy Reform Bill (Feb. 8, 2001) 
(“Judge Becker pointed out that appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are far more 
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was concerned by the lack of certainty in the bankruptcy field.36  Deci-
sions by the district courts, while functioning as the first layer of appel-
late review, did not create binding precedent.37  As a result, litigants 
would often forum-shop for courts more favorable to their position.38  
Consequently, many issues in bankruptcy law had no definitive resolu-
tion.39  This uncertainty created more litigation and a greater strain on 
the federal court system.40 
 
expensive than appeals to the district courts where the procedures are less formal.  
[As] 80% of the bankruptcy appeals never go beyond the district court . . . requiring 
appeals to the courts of appeals will make the process more, not less expensive.”). 
36 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 148 (2005) (“In addition to the time and cost 
factors attendant to the present appellate system, decisions rendered by a district court 
as well as a bankruptcy appellate panel are generally not binding and lack stare decisis 
value.”); see also Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Among the rea-
sons for the direct appeal amendment was widespread unhappiness at the paucity of 
settled bankruptcy-law precedent.”).  Legislators had been concerned by the lack of 
precedent in the field for many years.  In 1994, Senator Howell Heflin discussed the 
value in “establish[ing] a dependable body of case law” in bankruptcy.  Weber, 484 F.3d 
at 158 n.1 (alteration in original) (citing 140 CONG. REC. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin)).  Eight years later, Judith McKenna and Elizabeth 
Wiggins, in their seminal article on the issue, noted that 
[t]he bankruptcy appellate system is not well structured to produce binding 
precedent. . . . [A]ppellate caseloads are spread thinly among district judges, 
giving few judges much opportunity to develop bankruptcy expertise. More-
over, the inability of most appellate reviewers to create binding precedent di-
minishes the value of appellate review and is asserted to hinder lawyers’ and 
others’ ability to structure transactions and predict litigation outcomes.   
Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 
76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 627 (2002).  
37 See Fairchild Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 220 B.R. 
909, 917 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (“A district court’s ruling on a bankruptcy appeal 
enjoys little more precedential weight than does the original bankruptcy decision it-
self.”); see also Weber, 484 F.3d at 158 n.1 (“[O]ne bankruptcy court apparently felt un-
constrained even by the decisions of the district courts within its district.”).  Judith 
McKenna and Elizabeth Wiggins attributed uncertainty in the field to a lack of binding 
precedent.  See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 36, at 628 (“Both bankruptcy and dis-
trict judges attribute much of this uncertainty to the dearth of binding precedent from 
the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court.”). 
38 See Crabb, supra note 15, at 140 (noting that the system “[did] not foster predic-
tability” because “[as] long as litigants [could] choose their forum for appeal, they 
[could] shop for the one they think will be most favorable to their position”).  
39 See id. (explaining that bankruptcy appellate panels and district courts sitting as 
appellate courts do not “build a coherent body of law because their decisions issue 
from too many sources to provide coherency”); see also Paul M. Baisier & David G. Eps-
tein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law:  A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 525, 526-27, 527 n.9 (1995) (discussing issues in bankruptcy law that law-
yers “litigate again and again”); Anna Snider, Panel:  Take District Courts Out of Bankruptcy 
Appeals, 149 N.J. L.J. 972, 972 (1997) (stating that “even basic issues are relitigated fre-
FREEMAN_PRE_PRINT.DOC(DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  9:42 AM 
2011] BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals 553 
BAPCPA was not the first time Congress considered bankruptcy 
direct appeals.  Eight years earlier, the 1997 National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission41 suggested that the bankruptcy appellate structure 
needed reform.42  The Commission, concerned with “the cost, delay, 
and redundancy that is inherent” in the two-tiered bankruptcy appel-
late system,43 recommended the elimination of the first layer of re-
view.44  Section 1235 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 incorpo-
rated the Commission’s suggestion.45  Unlike BAPCPA, however, the 
Commission’s recommendation did not grant the courts of appeals 
the discretion to accept or deny appeals.  The Judicial Conference 
came out in vehement opposition to section 1235.46  The Confe-
 
quently” so that “you can find a decision in almost any area of bankruptcy to support 
or counter your position”). 
40 See Freyermuth, supra note 15, at 1070 (“A lack of doctrinal clarity [in bankrupt-
cy] produces a greater volume of disputes for the system to resolve, as parties already 
stuck in a largely zero-sum collection game posture to maximize their respective posi-
tions.”).  In one Seventh Circuit case, the court felt that direct review could “[l]ower 
litigation costs for thousands of debtors and creditors . . . by expediting appellate consid-
eration of [the] case.”  In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2007). 
41 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 established the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission as an independent commission to examine “issues relating to the 
Bankruptcy Code.”  NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 35, at 47.  
42 Interestingly, 
[t]he previous National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which convened in 
1970, rejected a proposal to eliminate the district court level of appeal.  The 
commission cited the remoteness of the courts of appeal and the risk of over-
loading the circuit courts’ dockets with litigants who may have been satisfied 
with district court determinations.   
Snider, supra note 39, at 984. 
43 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 35, at 717.   
44 See id. at 752-67 (noting that because “an appellate system should provide stabil-
ity and consistency in case law decision-making,” bankruptcy appellate procedure 
“should be changed to eliminate the first layer of review”).  The Commission assumed 
that direct appeal would not affect the distinction between core and noncore proceed-
ings.  Id. at 758.  The direct appeal provision would only apply to core proceedings and 
to those noncore proceedings in which the parties agreed to the entry of a final order 
by the bankruptcy judge.  Id.  In noncore proceedings, where a bankruptcy judge can 
only make a recommendation, a district court order would still constitute the first final 
order from which an appeal could be taken.  These would still be governed by §§ 1291 
and 1292, which control regular civil actions.  Id. at 758.  The Commission also rec-
ommended that bankruptcy courts be established under Article III.  Id. at 742-52.  
Such a change could eliminate the constitutional concerns that haunt bankruptcy ap-
pellate review to this day.  See Knight, supra note 18, at 256-60 (discussing the constitu-
tional concerns of providing an Article I court with jurisdiction that is typically re-
served for Article III courts, which are free from political pressures). 
45 S. 220, 107th Cong. § 1235 (2001).  
46 See News Release, supra note 35, at 1 (evaluating section 1235 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Bill and expressing concern about the section’s effects). 
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rence—represented by former Chief Judge Edward Becker of the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—was concerned that the work-
load in the appellate courts would increase by “upwards of three thou-
sand new cases per year.”47  In addition, while agreeing that greater 
certainty was needed in bankruptcy law, Chief Judge Becker felt that 
the fact-specific nature of courts of appeals’ bankruptcy opinions 
would not create meaningful precedent.48  To remedy these concerns, 
Judge Becker recommended that direct appeals require certification 
by the district court or BAP, a provision similar to what Congress in-
cluded in BAPCPA four years later.49 
III.  THE PROVISIONS OF § 158(D)(2) 
A textual analysis of § 158(d)(2) suggests that the provision func-
tions in two ways:  (1) it affects when matters can go up on appeal,50 
and (2) it affects which court will handle the appeal at each stage.51  
Practically speaking, it allows parties to appeal matters earlier in the 
proceedings (via interlocutory appeals)52 and permits cases to “leap 
frog” the district courts and receive direct review by the courts of ap-
peals.  However, the imprecise text of § 158(d)(2) makes it difficult to 
understand based solely on the language of the provision.53  Part V will 
 
47 Id. 
48 See id. (“Judge Becker observed . . . that most opinions in bankruptcy cases tend 
to be fact-bound, thereby creating little precedent . . . .”).  Note, however, that accord-
ing to the Second Circuit this may not be an issue:  “Congress believed direct appeal 
would be most appropriate where we are called upon to resolve a question of law not 
heavily dependent on the particular facts of a case, because such questions can often 
be decided based on an incomplete or ambiguous record.”  Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 
154, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).  Chief Judge Becker also cited a concern of the Department of 
Justice that without meaningful review by the district court, direct appeal to the court 
of appeals would create constitutional problems under Northern Pipeline.  News Release, 
supra note 35.  In contrast, the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission deter-
mined that direct appeals would be constitutional (to the extent that the current two-
tiered system was constitutional).  NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 35, at 
758-59 (“The appellate structure has no effect on the constitutionality of the bank-
ruptcy court system.”). 
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006) (facilitating appellate jurisdiction if the 
judgment is certified). 
50 See id. § 158(d)(2)(B) (specifying when bankruptcy courts, district courts, or 
BAPs should certify appeals). 
51 See id. § 158(d)(2)(A) (listing instances when courts of appeals have jurisdiction).  
52 Initially, the interlocutory-appeal issue was a matter of some debate.  See infra notes 
69-74 and accompanying text (noting that most circuit courts have held that § 158(d)(2) 
allows direct appeal of interlocutory appeals). 
53 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 5.05A[1], at 5-16 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 
15th ed. rev. 2009) (“Section 158(d)(2) of title 28 . . . is hardly an example of precise 
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discuss how courts have interpreted the text of § 158(d)(2) and how 
parties have used it thus far. 
Section 158(d)(2)(A) grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction to 
hear bankruptcy direct appeals.54  It specifies that the lower court (ei-
ther the bankruptcy court, the BAP, or the district court)55 “acting on 
its own motion” or at the “request” of any party to a judgment may 
certify the appeal if 
(i) the judgment, order or decree involves a question of law as to which 
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of 
the Supreme Court . . . or involves a matter of public importance ; 
(ii) the judgment, order or decree involves a question of law requiring the 
resolution of conflicting decisions ; or 
(iii) an immediate appeal from the judgment, order, or decree may ma-
terially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is 
taken.
56
 
Once the appeal is certified, the appropriate court of appeals must au-
thorize it.57 
In addition, § 158(d)(2) grants different amounts of discretion to 
the courts of appeals and the lower courts.  While the courts of ap-
peals have complete discretion over whether to grant the direct ap-
peal,58 lower courts must certify the application if a majority of the ap-
pellants and appellees make the request or if the request meets one of 
 
and careful drafting . . . .”).  Stephanie Freeman, a staff attorney at the Tenth Circuit 
BAP, also mentioned the “hasty and imprecise” drafting of § 158(d)(2) in an interview 
with the author.  Interview with Stephanie Freeman, Staff Attorney, Tenth Circuit BAP 
(Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with author). 
54 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  According to the Bankruptcy Rules, “[a] certification 
of a judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court to a court of appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) shall not be effective until a timely appeal has been taken.”  FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 8001(f)(1). 
55 According to the Bankruptcy Rules, the request for certification “shall be filed 
in the court in which a matter is pending for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2).”  FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(2).  A matter is considered “pending” “until the docketing, in 
accordance with Rule 8007(b).”  Id. 
56 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
57 Id. 
58 See Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Congress has explicitly 
granted us plenary authority to grant or deny leave to file a direct appeal, notwith-
standing the presence of one, two, or all three of the threshold conditions . . . .” (cita-
tion omitted)).  Notably, “[a]lthough [§ 158(d)(2)] sets forth in detail the standards 
for certification of the appeal by the lower courts or the parties, the . . . statute pro-
vides no direction to the court of appeals as to the circumstances under which such a 
petition should be granted.”  Bartell, supra note 11, at 159. 
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three statutory requirements under § 158(d)(2)(A).59  Specifically, 
§ 158(d)(2)(B) states that if “on its own motion or on the request of a 
party” the court determines that a circumstance specified in 
§ 158(d)(2)(A) exists, the court “shall” certify the appeal.60  In addi-
tion, if the court receives a request from the majority of the appellants 
and the appellees, the court “shall” certify the direct appeal.61  Section 
158(d)(2)(C) allows parties to “supplement the certification with a 
short statement of the basis for the certification.”62 
Section 158(d)(2)(D) states that an appeal does not stay any pro-
ceedings before the lower court unless the “respective” court “or the 
court of appeals in which the appeal in [sic] pending” issues a stay 
pending appeal.63  This provision grants an important authority to the 
lower courts that Part VI will discuss in more detail. 
Finally, § 158(d)(2)(E) requires that the request for certification 
by the parties “be made not later than sixty days after the entry of 
judgment, order or decree.”64  The lower court, however, is not held 
to the sixty-day standard when “acting on its own motion.”65  After ob-
taining the certification, the parties have thirty days to petition the 
court of appeals for permission to appeal.66  Notably, this deadline was 
increased from ten days.67  The interim rules noted that, unless speci-
 
59 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B).  Of course, the lower court has the discretion to de-
termine when and if a requirement has been met. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. § 158(d)(2)(B)(ii).  The ability of the parties to agree, without court in-
volvement, to certify the matter for direct appeal “has no parallel in current federal 
practice.”  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 5.05A[1], at 5-17. 
62 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(C). 
63 Id. § 158(d)(2)(D) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The language of the 
provision highlights that courts of appeals may (and this Comment argues should) 
consider granting a stay in concert with the permission for direct appeal to guarantee 
that an Article III court can create binding precedent.   
64 Id. § 158(d)(2)(E). 
65 Id. §§ 158(d)(2)(A), (E).  Ms. Freeman noted that, practically speaking, the 
lower court would likely certify the matter within sixty days if direct appeal were war-
ranted.  Interview with Stephanie Freeman, supra note 53. 
66 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(5).  
67 When BAPCPA was passed, Congress put interim rules into place “until a rule of 
practice or procedure . . . [could be] promulgated or amended.”  BAPCPA, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, § 1233(b)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 203 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158 note).  Compare 
id. § 1233(b)(4) (providing parties ten days to petition the court of appeals for permis-
sion to appeal), with FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(5) (providing thirty days).  Sec-
tion 1292(b), however, remains at ten days.  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Though the minutes 
from the Bankruptcy Conference mention the alteration, no explanation is given for 
why it was made.  Bankr. Minutes of the Judicial Conference, 2006 WL 2940712 
( J .C.U.S.), at *11 (March 8–10, 2006).  The Bankruptcy Committee’s May 2006 Report 
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fied otherwise, appeals should be taken as prescribed by Rule 5 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.68 
In addition to circumventing the district court, § 158(d)(2) ap-
plies to interlocutory orders, allowing matters often central to the 
bankruptcy proceeding to be reviewed earlier than they normally 
would.69  Although the drafting of § 158(d)(2) is vague on this point,70 
courts have largely held that interlocutory appeals may be the subject 
of a direct appeal.  The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in 2008 in  
In re OCA, Inc.71  Focusing on the reference to the “first sentence” of 
subsection (a), the Fifth Circuit determined that this provision autho-
rizes jurisdiction over interlocutory orders and decrees if granted 
leave by the district court.72  The Fifth Circuit also found that the sixty 
days permitted to request certification for a direct appeal applied 
equally to judgments, orders, and decrees that were either final or in-
 
to the Standing Committee also does not provide any insight; in the notes about Bank-
ruptcy Rule 8001(f)(5), the only applicable comment suggests that “Subdivision (f)(5) 
was added to advise parties that certification of an order or decree is insufficient to 
have the court of appeals hear the matter.”  Memorandum from Hon. Thomas S. Zilly, 
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing 
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 196 (May 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/Rules/Reports/BK05-2006.pdf.  
In the American Bankruptcy Institute’s survey, only one relevant respondent com-
mented:  “The time for taking an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision should be 
increased from 10 days to 28 days.”  ABI TASK FORCE ON BANKR. RULES, REPORT OF 
SURVEY ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 
app. B (2007), available at http://www.abiworld.org/Rules_CommentsFinal.pdf. 
68 § 1233(b)(3), 119 Stat. at 203 (“[A]n appeal authorized by the court of ap-
peals . . . shall be taken in the manner prescribed in . . . rule 5 of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.”). 
69 For instance, § 158(d)(2) might be applicable in instances when the matter 
does not meet the criteria of Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for 
a permissive appeal under § 1292.  Note that § 158(d)(2) is broader than § 1292.  See 
infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (investigating courts’ comparison of 
§ 158(d)(2) to the permissive appeal standard under § 1292(b), although appeals un-
der § 1292(b) are more limited than those under § 158(d)). 
70 Section 158(d)(2)(A) states that the “appropriate court of appeals shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals described in the first sentence of subsection (a).”  28 U.S.C 
§ 158(d)(2)(A).  “Subsection (a)” refers to § 158(a), which governs appeals by the dis-
trict court.  Id. § 158(a).  Subsection (3) of § 158(a) includes the phrase, “with leave of 
the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees.”  Id.  However, besides the ref-
erence to the “the first sentence” of § 158(a), § 158(d)(2)(A) only mentions “the 
judgment, order, or decree”; “interlocutory orders” is notably absent from the list, 
though it could be argued that “interlocutory order and decrees” is included in 
“judgment, order, or decree.”  Due to the lack of specificity, various circuit courts have felt 
compelled to address this issue directly.  See infra note 74 (surveying these opinions). 
71 552 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
72 Id. at 418. 
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terlocutory.73  Other courts have held similarly.74  Therefore, while the 
statute’s wording is less than precise, the unanimity of opinion sug-
gests that interlocutory judgments, orders, and decrees may be ap-
pealed directly to the courts of appeals. 
IV.  A COMPARISON OF § 158(D)(2) AND § 1292(B)  
In their application of § 158(d)(2), circuit courts have often 
sought guidance from previous interpretations of permissive interlo-
cutory appeals under § 1292(b).75  Like § 158(d)(2), Congress enacted 
§ 1292(b) to guarantee that the courts of appeals had jurisdiction to 
“‘rule on . . . ephemeral question[s] of the law that m[ight] disappear 
in the light of a complete and final record,’”76 which is particularly re-
levant in the context of mootness.  In addition, § 1292(b) “sought to 
 
73 See id. at 418 n.6 (stating that a party may request certification for direct appeal 
under § 158(d)(2)(E) up to sixty days after either final or interlocutory judgments, 
orders, or decrees). 
74 In February 2009, the Fourth Circuit granted a direct interlocutory appeal from 
a bankruptcy court’s orders without even addressing whether it had jurisdiction over 
interlocutory appeals.  See Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas 
Distribs., LLC), 556 F.3d 247, 250, 252 (4th Cir. 2009).  In October 2008, the Third 
Circuit noted that the new provisions under § 158(d)(2), established by  
BAPCPA, granted the courts of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory orders.  See In re 
Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 296 F. App’x 270, 275 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) ( Jordan, J., concur-
ring).  However, the court also recognized that it did not have this authority under the 
prior interpretation of § 158(d):  “[W]hile the district courts have jurisdiction to hear 
interlocutory appeals under subsection (a), subsection (d) gives us jurisdiction only 
over appeals from final orders.”  Id. at 276.  Also in October 2008, the Tenth Circuit 
mentioned briefly that “§ 158(d)(2) establishes procedures for us to review interlocu-
tory appeals.”  Harwell v. Dalton (In re Harwell), 298 F. App’x 733, 735 (10th Cir. 
2008).  The court noted, however, that the case did not invoke § 158(d)(2), so the 
matter was not resolved as a direct appeal.  Id.  Finally, the Seventh Circuit also dis-
cussed the matter in 2008:  “With the exception of a relatively new procedure for cer-
tain interlocutory appeals that has not been invoked here, the courts of appeals have 
jurisdiction only over appeals from final decisions entered by district courts under 
§ 158(a) and bankruptcy appellate panels under § 158(b).”  In re Comdisco, Inc., 538 
F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
75 See, e.g., Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are also 
assisted by our prior analysis of other grants of ‘discretionary jurisdiction,’ both in 
[§ 1292(b)] and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . 23(f).”). 
76 Id. at 159 (quoting Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 864 (2d Cir. 
1996)); see also Koehler at 865-66 (noting that Congress enacted § 1292(b) to “avoid pro-
tracted litigation”).  This quotation has troubling implications for bankruptcy direct 
appeals; because bankruptcy proceedings move more quickly than regular civil litiga-
tion, the concern that the doctrine of equitable mootness may absolve the need for the 
court of appeals to examine an issue could be of real concern.  See infra notes 134-40 and 
accompanying text (addressing the problems that arise under the doctrine of equitable 
mootness, such as actions that render the appeal moot). 
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assure the prompt resolution of knotty legal problems,”77 a concern 
that Congress also had when it passed § 158(d)(2).78 
BAPCPA’s direct appeal provision is also broader than § 1292(b), 
emphasizing that bankruptcy requires balancing an effective review 
with a speedy resolution.  Section 1292(b) provides that a district 
judge may allow parties to petition the court of appeals for permission 
for a direct appeal if the matter involves a “controlling question of law as 
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that 
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation.”79  In comparison, § 158(d)(2) does 
not limit direct appeals to “controlling legal issue[s].”80  A BAPCPA di-
rect appeal is also allowed when it “materially advance[s] a case’s 
progress,” while permissive interlocutory appeals are permitted only 
when “the appeal may materially advance the case’s ultimate termina-
tion.”81  Furthermore, § 1292(b) employs the conjunctive “and,” sug-
gesting permissive interlocutory appeals must include both (1) a sub-
stantial difference of opinion regarding controlling legal issues and 
(2) the need to resolve an issue that materially advances the case’s ul-
timate termination.82  In contrast, § 158(d)(2) uses the broader “or.”83  
In addition, “a matter of public importance,” another criteria that the 
lower court can use to certify the direct appeal under § 158(d)(2), has 
no equivalent in § 1292(b).84  Finally, unlike § 1292(b), § 158(d)(2) 
“expressly provides” that a direct appeal may be warranted “solely be-
cause there is no governing legal precedent.”85 
Procedurally, both provisions allow the court of appeals either to 
grant or deny the request.  However, § 1292(b) allows parties to peti-
tion the court of appeals for permission to appeal within ten days of 
the district court’s order.  In contrast, Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(5) 
gives parties thirty days from the lower court’s certification of the di-
rect appeal to petition the court of appeals.86  As no reason has been 
 
77 Weber, 484 F.3d at 159. 
78 See id. (discussing Congress’s intent in passing § 158(d)(2)). 
79 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
80 David George, An Idea Whose Time Has (Sort of) Come:  BAPCPA Provides Direct Ap-
peals from Bankruptcy Courts to Circuit Courts in Limited Situations 6 (bepress Legal Series, 
Working Paper No. 1134, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 5.05A[2], at 5-18 to 5-19. 
85 Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 159 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007). 
86 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(5). 
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given for this difference, and in light of the urgency surrounding bank-
ruptcy proceedings, this Comment recommends that rulemakers short-
en the timing provision of Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(5) to ten days.87 
V.  FOUR YEARS LATER:  § 158(D)(2) AND THE  
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS 
Five years after the enactment of BAPCPA, it is possible to assess 
whether Judge Becker’s fears about overburdening the federal judi-
ciary with bankruptcy appeals were mitigated by the discretion 
granted to the circuit courts of appeals.  In a recent survey of the case 
law, Professor Laura Bartell identified sixty-two cases in which the 
courts of appeals granted a direct appeal.88  Drawing on Professor Bar-
tell’s findings, Section V.A examines in what instances the courts of 
appeals have decided to grant review, including a survey of the num-
ber of cases in which the appellate court reversed and affirmed.  Sec-
tion V.B focuses on how the courts of appeals have ruled on particular 
procedural elements of direct appeals under § 158(d)(2).  Finally, 
Section V.C discusses Professor Bartell’s finding that § 158(d)(2) has 
had the effect Congress desired; namely, that it has both shortened 
the bankruptcy appeals process and created binding precedent. 
A.   Discretion:  How the Circuit Courts Have Applied § 158(d)(2) 
The first court of appeals case to address when a court should ex-
ercise its discretion to permit direct appeals was the Second Circuit’s 
Weber v. United States Trustee decision in 2007.89  The case involved 
whether the bankruptcy court could retroactively apply New York’s 
homestead exemption to the debtor-appellees’ property.90  Though 
the court ultimately denied the motion, the Second Circuit estab-
lished important guidance for the application of § 158(d)(2).  First, 
the court noted that courts of appeals are particularly suited for ans-
wering questions of law as they arise in the bankruptcy context: “When 
a discrete, controlling question of law is at stake, we may be able to 
 
87 See infra Part VIII (suggesting that shortening the time period for parties to peti-
tion the circuit court for permission to appeal would allow bankruptcy proceedings to 
continue with minimal delay). 
88 Bartell, supra note 11, at 161. 
89 484 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2007). 
90 Id. at 157. 
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settle the matter relatively promptly.”91  Although the court recog-
nized that other circuit courts would not be bound by its standards, 
the Second Circuit decided that it would grant a direct appeal only 
where there is “uncertainty in the bankruptcy courts . . . or where we 
find it patently obvious that the bankruptcy court’s decision is either 
manifestly correct or incorrect.”92 
The Second Circuit was hesitant to exercise review too readily.  
Recognizing the inherent tension in bankruptcy law between efficien-
cy and the right to review, the court asserted that “although Congress 
emphasized the importance of our expeditious resolution of bank-
ruptcy cases, it did not wish us to privilege speed over other goals.”93  
The court also cautioned that hearing direct appeals might actually 
hinder the development of binding precedent in bankruptcy because 
matters would be denied the opportunity to “percolate” in the district 
courts.94  It appears that the other circuits have heeded the Second 
Circuit’s warning; in most instances in which the courts of appeals 
have granted review95 it has been for matters of “first impression.”96 
 
91 Id. at 158.  Due to the flexible finality rule in bankruptcy, there are many “dis-
crete” issues that the courts of appeals may consider.  See KNIBB, supra note 16, § 14.2, 
at 341-42 (“Various steps in the bankruptcy process are often so distinct and conclusive 
either to the rights of the parties or the ultimate outcome of the proceeding that final 
decisions as to them are appealable as a matter of right.”). 
92 Weber, 484 F.3d at 161.  While drawing heavily on § 1292(b) for guidance on the 
application of § 158(d)(2), the court recognized that § 1292(b) was not meant to 
“serve an error-correction function,” which the court appears to bestow upon 
§ 158(d)(2).  See id. at 159 & n.3 (“Congress hoped that § 1233 would permit us to re-
solve controlling legal questions expeditiously and might foster the development of 
coherent bankruptcy-law precedent.”). 
93 Id. at 160. 
94 See id. (noting that appeals courts often benefit from reviewing a variety of dis-
trict court resolutions to unsettled bankruptcy questions). 
95 While it is critical to examine how direct appeals have been utilized by the cir-
cuit courts of appeals, it is also important to respond to Judge Becker’s concern of 
overloading the circuit courts.  Though eighty-one cases of certified direct appeals 
(sixty-two granted by the courts of appeals, nineteen denied) in four years across all of 
the circuits may appear to be manageable, Bartell, supra note 11, at 160-63, it is impor-
tant to recognize that this number reflects that § 158(d)(2) of BAPCPA was found not 
to apply retroactively.  See In re McKinney, 457 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
presumption that a procedural change is to be applied retroactively falls away when the 
statute making the change specifies that the statute shall not apply to pending cases as 
the new bankruptcy law does.” (citation omitted)).  Since 2005, there has been an up-
ward trend in the number of § 158(d)(2) certifications reviewed by the courts of ap-
peals.  According to Professor Bartell’s study, the number of cases has increased from 
three in the first year to sixteen in the second year, twenty-one in the third year, and 
back to sixteen in the fourth year (a twelve-month period ending on September 30, 
2009).  Bartell, supra note 11, at 163. 
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Of the sixty-two cases in which the court of appeals granted a di-
rect appeal, an opinion was issued thirty-seven times.97  Of those thirty-
seven opinions, in eight instances the court of appeals either stated 
that the appeal presented “a question of law as to which there is no 
controlling decision . . . or involve[d] a matter of public importance”98 
or noted that the direct appeal met both these requirements for certi-
fication under § 158(d)(2)(A)(i).99  One case noted only that there 
was “no controlling decision” in the jurisdiction,100 and in In re Pacific 
Lumber Co., the court mentioned the “prominence of this case to the 
citizens of California.”101  In nine instances, the court determined that 
the dispute was a matter of first impression.102  Another case noted 
 
 While it is possible that the number of cases will continue to rise, it is also possible 
that the number will continue to level off as more issues are resolved and greater cer-
tainty is brought to the bankruptcy field.  Notably, all of the courts of appeals, except 
for the Federal Circuit, have reviewed § 158(d)(2) certifications.  Id.  Most have been 
repeat players, with the Fifth Circuit using the provision most often.  Id. 
96 See Bartell, supra note 11, at 174-75 (reporting seventy-six out of ninety-two cases 
in which the court mentioned that there was no controlling decision). 
97 Id. at 161 n.129.  As of the time of Prefessor Bartell’s study, 
[i]n nine additional cases, the circuit court granted a petition for direct ap-
peal, but the appeal was subsequently dismissed or the case remanded on mo-
tion. . . . Three cases that were certified were dismissed without the court of 
appeals acting on a petition for leave to appeal. . . . In sixteen more cases the 
petition for leave to appeal directly was granted, but there is not yet any opi-
nion from the court. . . . Four cases that have been certified await a decision 
from the circuit court on the petition for leave to appeal, or the parties have 
not filed one.  
Id. at 161-62 n.129. 
 98 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (2006).   
99 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 
2009); Blausey v. U.S. Tr., 552 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009); Crosby v. Orthalliance 
New Image (In re OCA, Inc.), 552 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); DaimlerChrysler Fin. 
Servs. Ams. LLC v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 543 F.3d 1239, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008); Nuvell 
Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Dean (In re Dean), 537 F.3d 1315, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2008); Tide-
water Fin. Co. v. Kenney, 531 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 2008); Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. 
Jordan, 521 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 
2007).  The circuit courts in In re Dean and Drive Financial Services certified direct ap-
peals because they met all three criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). 
100 Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
101 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditor’s Comm. (In re Pac. 
Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 242 (5th Cir. 2009).  
102 See In re Howard, 597 F.3d 852, 853 (7th Cir. 2010); SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S&J 
Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2009); Egebjerg v. 
Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); Reinhardt v. Vander-
bilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Reinhardt), 563 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2009); Hutson v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., LLC), 556 F.3d 247, 255 (4th 
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that the matter was “indeed important” for the court to consider.103  In 
eight cases, the appropriate court of appeals identified that the appeal 
would resolve “conflicting decisions”104 present within its jurisdiction 
or others.105  Interestingly, in some cases the court did not feel the 
need to address the nature of the appeal at all; instead, the court 
simply stated (in some fashion), “we have jurisdiction under 
§ 158(d)(2).”106  Even where the court did not specify, the matters re-
viewed appear to be questions of law not addressed in prior cases.107  
Ironically, many of the cases in which review was granted involved un-
certainty surrounding new provisions included in BAPCPA.108  In many 
 
Cir. 2009); Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC, 566 F.3d 699, 700 (7th 
Cir. 2009); In re Barrett, 543 F.3d at 1241; Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Sandoval (In re 
Sandoval), 541 F.3d 997, 998 (10th Cir. 2008); Tidewater, 531 F.3d at 314. 
103 See In re Turner, 574 F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The issue is indeed impor-
tant.  In the wake of the bursting of the housing bubble . . . many mortga-
gors . . . cannot meet their mortgage obligations . . . .”). 
104 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
105 See In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1282; Thompson, 566 F.3d at 700; Ennis v. Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC (In re Ennis), 558 F.3d 343, 344 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Barrett, 543 F.3d at 
1242; Nuvell Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Dean (In re Dean), 537 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2008); Tidewater, 531 F.3d at 315; Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343, 345 
(5th Cir. 2008); In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 2007). 
106 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 
741 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as 
moot, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009); 
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Future Media, 536 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2008); Wachovia 
Dealer Servs. v. Jones (In re Jones), 530 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2008); Garcia v. 
Dockery (In re Garcia), 282 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2008); AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. Moore, 517 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2008); Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 
515 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2008); Ad Hoc Grp. of Timber Noteholders v. Pac. Lumber 
Co. (In re Scotia Pac. Co.), 508 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2007); Perlin v. Hitachi Capital 
Am. Corp. (In re Perlin), 497 F.3d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 2007). 
107 See, e.g., In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743 (discussing the “hanging paragraph” in 
§ 1325 of BAPCPA and noting that “[t]he Tenth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits” were 
the “only three to resolve this issue” at that time). 
108 See Bartell, supra note 11, at 146 (“[I]n the vast majority of those cases in which 
it is invoked the direct appeal is necessary because of the ambiguities created by the 
very statute in which the amendment was made, BAPCPA.”).  Courts were particularly 
perplexed by the “hanging paragraph” in § 1325 of BAPCPA.  The section earned its 
name because it was “arbitrarily placed without a number reference” and “does not in 
any way relate to the code sections amid which it resides.”  Julianne R. Frank, Key Strat-
egies and Considerations in Chapter 13, in BEST PRACTICES FOR FILING CHAPTER 13, at 51, 
61 (2010).  At its most basic, the “hanging paragraph” “constrains debtors from ‘strip-
ping’ or ‘cramming down’ purchase money loans on their vehicles if they have not 
owned the vehicle for more than 910 days.” Id.  Several cases have used direct appeals 
to address the “hanging paragraph.”  See, e.g., In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 741; In re 
Ford, 574 F.3d at 1281; In re Turner, 574 F.3d at 350; In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 636 (5th 
Cir. 2009); Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., LLC), 556 F.3d 247, 
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of the categories mentioned, some cases overlap (for instance, a court 
may have justified direct review on the basis of a “question of law 
where there was no controlling decision,” as well as “previous conflict-
ing decisions”). 
In describing the need for direct appeals, one scholar mentioned 
that the decisions of bankruptcy judges are rarely reversed, suggesting 
that two levels of review may be unnecessary.109  In comparison, there 
is a relatively high rate of reversals in direct appeals.  Of the thirty-
seven cases in which the courts of appeals granted jurisdiction and is-
sued an opinion, ten resulted in reversals (often with a remand),110 
twenty were affirmed,111 and six were vacated and remanded.112  One 
case, In re Pacific Lumber Co., was reversed on one matter, declared 
moot on others, and affirmed on the remaining issues.113  Frequent re-
 
253 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Barrett, 543 F.3d at 1241; In re Dean, 537 F.3d at 1319; In re 
Jones, 530 F.3d at 1289; Tidewater, 531 F.3d at 314-16; Drive Fin. Servs., 521 F.3d at 346; 
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 517 F.3d at 989; In re Perlin, 497 F.3d at 371; In re Wright, 492 F.3d 
at 831.  For a list of twenty-four cases in which a court has certified a direct appeal to 
address the “hanging paragraph” issue, see Bartell, supra note 11, at 176 -77 nn.176 -78.  
109 See Freyermuth, supra note 15, at 1075 (“[R]eversal rates in bankruptcy appeals 
are relatively low, which at least raises some question of whether an additional level of 
judicial review improves actual decision making quality to an extent that justifies its 
cost.” (footnote omitted)). 
110 See In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 741-43; In re Turner, 574 F.3d at 356; In re Miller, 
570 F.3d at 641; Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 708 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 
2009); Ennis v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Ennis), 558 F.3d 343, 344 (4th Cir. 
2009); In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., 556 F.3d at 250; Gen. Elec., 536 F.3d at 975; In re Garcia, 
282 F. App’x at 551; AmeriCredit, 517 F.3d at 989. 
111 See, e.g., In re Howard, 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010); eCast Settlement 
Corp. v. Washburn (In re Washburn), 579 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 2009); Schaefer v. 
Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. (In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc.), 591 F.3d 350, 355 
(5th Cir. 2009); SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, LP), 
579 F.3d 411, 426 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 112-13; In re Egebjerg, 574 
F.3d at 1047; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1281; Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248, 251 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Jafari v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC (In re Jafari), 569 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 
2009); Reinhardt v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Reinhardt), 563 F.3d 558, 565 
(6th Cir. 2009); Blausey v. U.S. Tr., 552 F.3d 1124, 1126 -27 (9th Cir. 2009); OCA, Inc. 
v. Orthalliance New Image (In re OCA), 552 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008); In re San-
doval, 541 F.3d 997, 998 (10th Cir. 2008); Maney v. Kagenveama (In re Kagenveama), 
541 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2008); Drive Fin. Servs., 521 F.3d at 350; In re Kingsley, 518 
F.3d 874, 876 (11th Cir. 2008); In re Bateman, 515 F.3d at 280; In re Scotia Pac., 508 F.3d 
at 216; In re Perlin, 497 F.3d at 367; In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 831. 
112 See In re Barrett, 543 F.3d at 1247; In re Meadows, 292 F. App’x 256, 257 (4th Cir. 
2008); DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., LLC v. Samek, 291 F. App’x 502, 503 (4th Cir. 
2008); In re Dean, 537 F.3d at 1320; In re Jones, 530 F.3d at 1291-92; Tidewater, 531 F.3d 
at 314-15. 
113 The result of this case will be discussed in more detail in Part VII, infra. 
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versals in direct appeals indicate that courts are using § 158(d)(2) as 
Congress intended—namely, when there is uncertainty in the law.  Ra-
ther than simply affirming the bankruptcy courts’ decisions, the cir-
cuit courts are discovering that they must correct the lower courts’ mis-
applications of difficult areas of bankruptcy law to establish the proper 
binding precedent. 
The courts of appeals declined to hear matters certified for direct 
appeal by a lower court nineteen times, in comparison to granting the 
direct appeal on sixty-two occasions.114  In only a few instances did the 
court reject an appeal because the matter was within the purview of 
the lower courts or because the matter failed to meet the statutory re-
quirements.115  This practice suggests that, despite their discretion to 
deny the appeal for any reason, the circuit courts are finding that the 
majority of matters that the lower courts choose to certify are worthy 
of review.116  In two of those instances, the circuit court denied the di-
rect appeal because the parties failed to file a timely notice of appeal 
as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(1).117  In a third case, the 
court of appeals found that it could not exercise jurisdiction because 
 
114 Bartell, supra note 11, at 161.  “In only nineteen of those cases did the court of 
appeals reject the petition on the merits, and in one of those nineteen the reason for 
the rejection was that the issue that was the subject of the certified case had just been 
decided by the circuit court in another direct appeal.”  Id. at 164-65. 
115 See, e.g., W. Aircraft, Inc. v. Lisowski (In re Silver State Helicopters, LLC), 566 
F.3d 1177, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying the appeal because the “order at issue is fully 
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court, and resolution of the underlying is-
sue . . . is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the ongoing proceedings”); In re Da-
vis, 512 F.3d 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In this case, material advancement is not a fac-
tor to be considered.  Further, the extent of the conflict is unclear.”); Weber v. U.S. 
Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In sum, we think that prior consideration by 
the district court would be beneficial and there is no compelling reason for this court 
to address the issue in the first instance.”).   
116 However, this accounting does not reflect instances where the lower court de-
nied certification on issues that arguably deserved direct review. 
117 Failure to file a timely notice of appeal was an issue both times the First Circuit 
addressed the matter in In re Weaver.  See Weaver v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C. (In re 
Weaver), 319 F. App’x 1, 2 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that among “[t]he problems 
identified in the order to show cause [was] the defendant’s failure to file a timely peti-
tion for leave to take a direct appeal in this court as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
8001(f)(5)”); Weaver v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C. (In re Weaver), 542 F.3d 257, 258 
(1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting a direct appeal because plaintiff failed to file a timely notice 
of appeal as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(1)).  Although the Sixth Circuit was 
also concerned by a failure to file a timely notice of appeal, the court did not decide 
the issue because it found the case did not warrant a direct appeal on its merits.  See In 
re Davis, 512 F.3d at 858 (“[T]he extent of the conflict is unclear.”). 
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§ 158(d)(2) did not apply retroactively.118  In another, the court of ap-
peals found that it could not hear the direct appeal because the mat-
ter was moot.119 
B.  Treatment of § 158(d)(2) Procedure by the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
As discussed above, the courts of appeals have denied direct ap-
peals when parties failed to file a timely notice of appeal as required 
by Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(1).120  However, when possible, the courts 
of appeals have treated other procedural errors as “technical” in order 
to exercise review over the direct appeal.  Indeed, in the three in-
stances discussed below, courts were inclined to adjudicate unresolved 
questions of law notwithstanding procedural errors.  These cases sug-
gest that the courts have largely embraced Congress’s aim and are will-
ing to use their discretion to create a predictable body of precedent in 
bankruptcy law. 
For instance, in In re Turner, the bankruptcy court clerk filed the 
certification order, the trustee’s request for certification, and a short 
record in the court of appeals.  According to Rule 5 of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, the parties should have filed 
the notice of appeal.121  Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, writing 
for the majority, argued that the material transmitted by the bank-
ruptcy court clerk included everything that a petition for review from 
the parties would have contained.122  Because the error was technical 
in nature, Judge Posner maintained that under a theory of “functional 
 
118 See In re McKinney, 457 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Act provides, with 
immaterial exceptions, that it ‘shall not apply with respect to cases commenced under 
title 11, United States Code, before the effective date of this Act.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1501(b)(1) (2006))). 
119 See Salazar v. Heitkamp, 193 F. App’x 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Treating Peti-
tioners’ notice as a request for permission to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 
5(a)(1) . . . we conclude that their appeal would be moot and deny permission.”). 
120 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which courts 
have denied direct appeals due to procedural failings).  Note that Rule 2 of the Feder-
al Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the court of appeals—“to expedite its decision 
or for other good cause”—to “suspend any provision of these rules in a particular case 
and order proceedings as it directs, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).”  FED. 
R. APP. P. 2.  Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure exempts issues of 
time limits from this grant of discretion.  FED. R. APP. P. 26(b).   
121 See In re Turner, 574 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that although a re-
quest for certification should generally be filed by the appellant, it was permissible for 
the clerk of the bankruptcy court to transmit the petition). 
122 See id. (“No purpose behind the statutory requirements for perfecting a direct 
appeal to the court of appeals in a bankruptcy case was disserved.”).  
FREEMAN_PRE_PRINT.DOC(DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  9:42 AM 
2011] BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals 567 
equivalence” the court of appeals could proceed with the case.123  This 
tactic was similar to the one the Ninth Circuit adopted in Blausey v. 
United States Trustee.124  Blausey and In re Turner are distinguishable 
from the In re Weaver cases (where failure to file a timely notice of ap-
peal was regarded as material) because in In re Weaver, the First Circuit 
received either nothing from the parties or only the certification or-
der from the district court.125 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that failure to obtain certification 
from the proper court was “technical in nature” and thus did not pre-
vent the direct appeal from moving forward in the court of appeals.126  
Because the district court granted certification before the matter was 
docketed in that court, the case was still “pending” in the bankruptcy 
court, which should have issued certification according to Interim 
Bankruptcy Rule 8001(f)(2).127  However, because both courts indi-
cated that they wished to certify the direct appeal, and because the er-
ror “[did] not affect the substantial rights of the parties,” the Fifth 
Circuit allowed the matter to proceed.128 
 
123 See id. at 352-53 (citing the test the Supreme Court established in Torres v. Oakl-
and Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988)). 
124 552 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2009).  As in In re Turner, the parties failed to file a peti-
tion for review, but the certification order and the record mistakenly transmitted by 
the bankruptcy court clerk were deemed to be acceptable.  See id. (agreeing to exercise 
jurisdiction over the direct appeal in part because the courts were involved in the 
“posture that created the procedural ambiguity”).  Reviewing Blausey, Judge Posner 
argued:  “[I]t would be pointless to create a circuit split over so transitory, so ephemer-
al, an issue, and to do so in attempted vindication of a harsh rule that has no basis in 
any case, or in practical need, or no consideration of justice or efficiency.”  In re Turner, 
574 F.3d at 354.  Both cases, however, included a dissent that argued that the failure 
was jurisdictional.  Id. at 356 (Van Bokkelen, J., dissenting); Blausey, 552 F.3d at 1134 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
125 When the First Circuit addressed the matter in In re Weaver for the first time, 
the appellants unsuccessfully argued that the certification order should constitute a 
timely notice of appeal.  Weaver v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C. (In re Weaver), 542 F.3d 
257, 257 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008).  The second time, the parties applied for direct appeal but 
were simply too late.  Weaver v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C. (In re Weaver), 19 F. App’x 
1, 2 (1st Cir. 2009).  As mentioned previously, failure to file a timely appeal was also a 
problem in In re Davis, but the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided against the direct ap-
peal on its merits.  See supra note 117 (discussing the court’s decision to deny review). 
126 See Ad Hoc Grp. of Timber Noteholders v. Pac. Lumber Co. (In re Scotia Pac. 
Co.), 508 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his error is technical in nature, does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties, and prompts us to exercise our discretion in 
favor of proceeding to the merits of this appeal.”). 
127 Id. at 219. 
128 Id. at 220. 
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C.  The Success of § 158(d)(2) 
As discussed in Part II, Congress’s two motivating objectives be-
hind passing § 158(d)(2) were (1) to create binding precedents in 
bankruptcy law and (2) to create a faster, less costly mechanism for 
bankruptcy appeals.  According to Professor Bartell’s recent study of 
the case law, both goals have been achieved.129 
First, final decisions by the circuit courts of appeals—which are 
easier to reach upon direct appeal—have resolved many of the thor-
niest issues in bankruptcy law and created binding precedent.  After 
reviewing each area of the law that has been examined on direct ap-
peal, Bartell noted that “[n]ot only did the direct appeals . . . provide 
a single, definitive rule applicable throughout the circuits where the 
appeals took place, but they also provided thoughtful opinions that 
could be considered by courts in other circuits where no uniform rule 
had been established.”130  Direct appeals have also accelerated matters 
so that some of the most difficult issues in bankruptcy law may come 
“before the highest court in the land.”131 
Second, after comparing the median time for two-tiered bank-
ruptcy appeals against direct appeals, it is apparent “that § 158(d)(2) 
has been effective at shaving months off the appeal process for direct 
bankruptcy appeals.”132  According to Professor Bartell’s study, 
direct appeals of bankruptcy cases are generally resolved in the circuit 
court more quickly than the median time for all bankruptcy appeals to 
the circuit court, and are always resolved more quickly than the time that 
would have been necessary for both an appeal to the district court or 
BAP and an appeal to the circuit court . . . .133 
 
129 Bartell, supra note 11, at 207-08 (concluding that § 158(d)(2) is “significantly 
reducing the time necessary to obtain a final determination on appeal from the circuit 
court” and is “proving effective at providing a definitive resolution of issues of law”). 
130 Id. at 189. 
131 Id. at 196.  For example, on the matter of disposable income, direct appeals 
created a circuit conflict that “was highlighted in the petition for writ of certiorari in 
Hamilton v. Lanning.” Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamilton v. Lanning, 
130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010) (No. 08-0998)).  The petition noted that the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits interpreted “disposable income” as discussed in section 1325(b)(1)(B) of 
BAPCPA in a manner that “directly” conflicted with the Ninth Circuit.  Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 8.  Subsequent to the publication of Professor Bartell’s 
study, the Supreme Court decided Hamilton v. Lanning and held that courts “may ac-
count for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually cer-
tain at the time of confirmation.”  Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2478. 
132 Bartell, supra note 11, at 184. 
133 Id. 
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These findings, however, do not resolve the inherent tension be-
tween speed and the right to review in bankruptcy appellate law.  
While direct appeals are generally faster than the traditional two-
tiered appellate structure, in individual cases even the two-tiered 
structure may move too quickly to provide an opportunity for ade-
quate review.  Therefore, when a matter has been certified for direct 
appeal, it is critical that the court of appeals also consider whether a 
stay should be granted to prevent the issue at hand from becoming 
moot.  This is the focus of Part VI. 
 VI.  THE ROLE OF THE LOWER COURTS:  THE IMPACT OF STAYS AND 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS 
The existing case law suggests that when a lower court chooses to 
certify a direct appeal, the circuit courts have found the matter to be 
worthy of review by a court that can create binding precedent.  How-
ever, due to the current construction of § 158(d)(2), this review does 
not always occur.  If the lower court grants certification for direct ap-
peal but rejects the motion for a stay pending that appeal, the matter 
may become moot before it reaches the circuit court.  This outcome 
not only denies the individual appellant the opportunity for review by 
an Article III court,134 but also undermines Congress’s intent to create 
predictable precedent in bankruptcy law. 
As mentioned previously, the lower courts do not have the same 
discretion to grant a certification for direct appeal under § 158(d)(2) 
as courts of appeals have to grant the appeal.135  If a request meets any 
of the statutory requirements or if a majority of both parties petition 
for certification, the lower court “shall” grant certification for direct 
appeal.136  The lower courts do, however, have the discretion to either 
 
134 The equitable mootness doctrine  
represents a type of “judicial anomaly” in that it allows appellate courts to 
avoid their obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted by Article III.  This 
constitutes a radical concept because . . . a party takes no action whatsoever to 
relinquish a right to adjudication of her claim.  Instead, a court voluntarily re-
frains from adjudicating the rights of the parties to the appeal solely due to 
the implications of its decision on the rights of third parties.  
Murphy, supra note 12, at 45. 
135 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (noting that the district court must 
certify an appeal if one of the statutory requirements of § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) is met). 
136 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B) (2006).  However, this is not meant to suggest that 
the lower courts must grant all requests for certification.  It is still within the authority 
of the court to determine whether any of the three statutory requirements exist; if not, 
it will deny the certification.  It should also be noted that if a one of the lower courts 
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grant or deny a stay pending appeal under § 158(d)(2)(D).137  While 
this provision also allows the courts of appeals to grant a stay, parties 
must request a stay from the bankruptcy judge first pursuant to Bank-
ruptcy Rule 8005.138  In most instances where a lower court is asked to 
consider both a certification for direct appeal and a stay pending that 
appeal, the answer will be the same:  either both will be granted139 or 
both will be denied.140  This result is logical, since a matter worthy of 
direct certification would also likely merit a stay pending appeal.141  
However, this result does not always occur; in In re Pacific Lumber Co., 
“[n]either the bankruptcy court nor a [Fifth Circuit] motions pan-
el . . . stayed plan confirmation pending appeal.”142 
 
(for instance, the bankruptcy court) denies the request, the party may still request cer-
tification from the district court or the BAP.  See, e.g., Berman v. Kessler (In re Ber-
man), Nos. 04-45436, 05-42285, 2007 WL 43973, at *2 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 5, 2007) 
(“The Bankruptcy Court is not the final gatekeeper of this direct appeal process.  On 
its face Section 158(d)(2) does not prohibit a party to a properly filed appeal from 
seeking certification from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel or the District Court.”). 
137 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) also allows the district court to choose whether to stay the 
proceedings. 
138 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005 (“A motion for a stay of the judgment, order, or decree 
of a bankruptcy judge, for approval of a supersedeas bond, or for other relief pending 
appeal must ordinarily be presented to the bankruptcy judge in the first instance.”).  
139 See, e.g., In re Amaravathi Ltd. P’ship, Bankr. No. 09-32754, Civ. No. 09-1908, 
2009 WL 2342749, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2009) (granting a stay pending appeal, on 
its own motion, after certifying a party’s request for direct appeal); In re Stone Barn 
Manhattan LLC, 398 B.R. 359, 368 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[O]n its own motion, the 
Court stays its decision so that the parties will have an opportunity to appeal.  If the 
parties desire, the Court will include in an order a certificate supporting an immediate 
appeal to the Court of Appeals.”). 
140 If a matter is not certified for direct appeal, there is no need for a stay.  See, e.g., 
Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Inc. (In re Am. Home Mortg. Invest. 
Corp.), 408 B.R. 42, 44-45 (D. Del. 2009) (denying the stay pending appeal and the 
certification for direct appeal); In re Marrama, 345 B.R. 458, 460 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2006) (denying both the stay and request for direct appeal); In re Waczewski, No. 06-
00620, 2006 WL 1594141, at *5-6 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 5, 2006) (denying the stay and 
the certification for direct appeal because § 158(d)(2) does not apply retroactively). 
141 When asked about § 158(d)(2)(D), Stephanie Freeman, a staff attorney on the 
Tenth Circuit BAP, remarked that she “[did not] see why [the] lower court would deny 
the stay.”  Interview with Stephanie Freeman, supra note 53.  She explained that if a 
motion was certified for a direct appeal it would likely be granted a stay pending ap-
peal.  In her opinion, a certification without a stay is unlikely (“[it] probably wouldn’t 
happen that way”).  Id.  However, In re Pacific Lumber Co. is evidence that this can and 
does occur. 
142 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. 
Lumber Co.), 584 F. 3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2009); see also infra notes 186-96 and ac-
companying text (detailing the procedural posture that led to this result).  Following 
In re Pacific Lumber Co., the Fifth Circuit again confronted the situation where a Bank-
ruptcy Court certified the direct appeal without staying the final confirmation order.  
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Although no scholar has discussed it at length, a few have briefly 
expressed concern that the discretion to deny motions for stays pend-
ing appeals may undermine the intent of § 158(d)(2) to bring certain-
ty to the bankruptcy field.  In their article on the standards governing 
stays, Richard Kanowitz and Michael Klein highlighted that “[t]he de-
lay inherent in prosecuting appeals of bankruptcy court or-
ders . . . may render [direct appeals under § 158(d)(2)] meaningless 
where the activity or action authorized by the order appealed from 
has not been stayed pending appeal.”143  Another scholar, George  
Kuney, was even more cynical: 
Perhaps [direct appeals] will have the beneficial effect of speeding reso-
lution of questions of law on a circuit-wide basis.  However, they miss the 
point entirely in terms of most use, sale, or lease; financing; or plan con-
firmation orders where a quick cell phone call from the courthouse—
‘the order has been entered’—triggers a closing or loan funding—‘pull 
the trigger’—that itself moots the appeal of the order, authorizing the 
transaction.  Give any good lawyer a tool like that and she will use it.144 
Thus, a tension between § 158(d)(2) and Article III arises when a low-
er court can certify a motion for direct appeal to the court of appeals 
(likely on a “controlling” issue of law or to resolve a conflict amongst 
the courts) and at the same time deny a motion to grant a stay pending 
appeal.  As a result, the case could move forward despite the lower 
court’s acknowledgment that at least one matter deserves review by a 
court that can create binding precedent.145  Of course, this would not 
be a problem if the issue truly were a discrete matter that did not af-
fect any other part of the case.146  However, the possibility remains that 
if the case moves forward, further appeals may be moot.  This out-
 
See Schaefer v. Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. (In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc.), 591 
F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2010).  The Court, in another opinion by Chief Judge Jones, 
quickly determined that the equitable mootness doctrine did not bar review, applying 
the standard put forth in In re Pacific Lumber Co. of “whether the court can fashion ef-
fective relief without interfering with the finality of a confirmed plan.”  Id. (citing In re 
Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 240).  
143 Richard S. Kanowitz & Michael A. Klein, The Divergent Interpretation of the Stan-
dard Governing Motions for Stay Pending Appeal of Bankruptcy Court Orders, 17 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 557, 557 (2008). 
144 George W. Kuney, Slipping into Mootness, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 267, 280 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 2007). 
145 Because the parties must bring motions for stays, this result could also occur if 
a lawyer was not astute enough to file a petition for a stay pending appeal simulta-
neously with the request for certification for direct appeal.  However, the lower court 
could still grant the stay on its own accord. 
146 See supra note 91 (recognizing that various steps of the bankruptcy process are 
“distinct and conclusive”). 
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come would not only deny the court of appeals an opportunity to ad-
judicate but would also prevent the appealing party from having its 
matter reviewed by an Article III court.147 
The problem created by stays, mootness, and direct appeals is one 
inherent in almost all bankruptcy procedure:  balancing fairness and 
the right of review (especially by an Article III court) against the ur-
gency of the proceedings.  As Stephanie Freeman, an attorney at the 
Tenth Circuit BAP, remarked, the “point of bankruptcy is [that] it is 
speedy.”148  Therefore, the opportunity to deny stays is also necessary 
to ensure that the case continues to move forward and that the rights 
of the other parties, those not requesting the direct appeal, are res-
pected.149  It is central to bankruptcy that parties can rely on final or-
ders so that they may continue with their business.150  However, proce-
dures meant to address the urgency of the proceedings are often in 
direct conflict with the right to review and may undermine the long-
term intent of Congress to bring certainty to the bankruptcy field. 
A.  The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness and the Impact on Direct Appeals 
Failure to grant a stay pending appeal may undercut the aim of 
§ 158(d)(2) because of the doctrine of equitable mootness.151  The 
 
147 See Knight, supra note 18, at 265 (characterizing the improper denial of review 
by an Article III court as undermining the legitimacy of bankruptcy appeals); cf. Crabb, 
supra note 15, at 138 (“Even in the earliest days of the colonies, when American courts 
combined administrative, legislative and judicial functions, the right to appeal was a 
central feature.”).   
148 Interview with Stephanie Freeman, supra note 53. 
149 See KNIBB, supra note 16, § 14.5, at 355 (“If proceedings in the bankruptcy 
courts had to stop during every appeal, the process would take years to complete.”). 
150 See Patrick M. Birney, Bankruptcy Rule 9024:  Paper Tiger or Powerful Procedural 
Tool When Stacked Against the Bankruptcy Code, 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 363, 365 
(2009) (“A primary theme within our current bankruptcy system is the significant im-
portance of finality in orders and judgments.” (footnote omitted)).  
151 Three types of mootness are relevant in the bankruptcy context:  constitutional 
mootness, equitable mootness, and statutory mootness.  Equitable mootness, which is 
the focus of this Comment, is broader than constitutional mootness but narrower than 
statutory mootness (which applies under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) to good-faith purchasers).  
It is more likely that a court will confront equitable mootness on direct appeal; for ex-
ample, this was the doctrine that was discussed in detail in In re Pacific Lumber Co.  See 
infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.  Constitutional mootness prevents an Article 
III court from issuing an advisory opinion.  According to this doctrine, litigants must 
have a stake in the outcome during the entire case.  To prevent a matter from being 
constitutionally moot, it must “(1) present a real legal controversy, (2) genuinely affect 
an individual, and (3) have sufficiently adverse parties.”  Kuney, supra note 144, at 268.  
Equitable mootness is a broader doctrine that reflects an unwillingness (not an inabili-
ty) to grant an alternative outcome because it would be inequitable.  Id. at 269. 
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doctrine of equitable mootness, like other aspects of bankruptcy, em-
bodies the tensions inherent in this area of the law: 
Refusing to address the merits of an appeal based on equitable mootness 
deprives a party from an adjudication of its rights where jurisdiction is 
constitutionally proper; whereas disregarding equitable mootness can al-
low the appeal of one interested party to clog the entire bankruptcy 
process thereby impeding the debtor’s emergence and potentially affect-
ing the interest of thousands of stakeholders.152  
Thus, by refusing to grant a stay pending a direct appeal, it is likely 
that the lower court is exhibiting a preference for expediting the liti-
gation, potentially at the expense of ensuring meaningful review. 
The doctrine of equitable mootness usually applies only when a 
party appeals a final bankruptcy order or judgment.153  According to 
the doctrine, if actions take place during the appeal that preclude the 
court from providing the party with the requested relief, the appeal is 
moot.154  The doctrine recognizes that if parties move forward (for ex-
ample, with a reorganization), it would be inequitable to reverse the 
transaction, especially if this would affect third parties (for example, 
after the sale of a property).155  However, if an appeal is moot, thus 
preventing the district court or the court of appeals (on direct appeal) 
from hearing the matter, the party will not have the opportunity to 
have its objection reviewed by an Article III court.156  Therefore, fail-
ure to stay proceedings pending appeal effectively allows determina-
tions by the bankruptcy court, an Article I court, to escape not only 
Article III review, but also any review whatsoever.157 
 
152 Murphy, supra note 12, at 45.   
153 Birney, supra note 150, at 366. 
154 Id. 
155 See Corrine Ball, Appeals of Confirmation Orders and the Doctrine of Equitable Moot-
ness (recognizing that the doctrine is rooted in “the equitable principles that underlie 
almost every aspect of the bankruptcy code”), in 1 30TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 83, 91 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. A-905, 2008); see also Daniel J. Artz, Equitable Mootness in 
Bankruptcy Appeals:  A Constitutionally Questionable Doctrine, LAWTOPIC.ORG (Nov. 22, 
2006), http://www.lawtopic.org/article.cfm?ID=243 (noting that the doctrine of 
equitable mootness “can also be applied . . . when the settlement impacts objecting 
third-parties’ rights”). 
156 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (“‘[M]ootness’ is not an Article III inquiry as to whether a live controversy is 
presented; rather, it is a recognition by the appellate courts that there is a point 
beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions.”). 
157 See Murphy, supra note 12, at 45-46 (expressing concern that equitable mootness 
can extinguish a party’s right to appellate review); Knight, supra note 18, at 265 (ex-
plaining the manner in which equitable mootness can preclude review).  Then-Judge 
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Though the doctrine is “widely recognized and accepted,”158 there 
is still debate as to when equitable mootness should apply.159  The 
“lack of uniformity” on this question across the circuits means that a 
party may be “deprived of an opportunity to have a court . . . even 
reach the merits of an appeal based largely on the location in which 
the case is filed.”160  The Fourth Circuit adopted a four-factor “totality 
of circumstances” test: 
(1) whether the appellant sought and obtained a stay; (2) whether the 
reorganization plan or other equitable relief ordered has been substan-
tially consummated;
161
 (3) the extent to which the relief requested on 
appeal would affect the success of the reorganization plan or other 
 
Alito, while sitting on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote a dissenting opinion in 
In re Continental Airlines describing equitable mootness as “permitting federal district 
courts and courts of appeals to refuse to entertain the merits of live bankruptcy appeals 
over which they indisputably possess statutory jurisdiction and in which they can plainly 
provide relief.”  91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
158 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 559 (majority opinion).  In a footnote, the major-
ity stated that because the doctrine is “well accepted, there is little discussion in the 
case law of its historical basis.” Id. at 558 n.1. 
159 See Ball, supra note 155, at 91 (“Although all circuits currently recognize the doc-
trine of equitable mootness, the tests . . . to determine the doctrine’s applicability vary.”). 
160 Murphy, supra note 12, at 46. 
161 “Substantially consummated” is defined in § 1101(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as   
(A) [a] transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan 
to be transferred;  
(B) [an] assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the 
plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the 
property dealt with by the plan; and  
(C) [the] commencement of distribution under the plan.   
11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2006).  Although substantial consummation may be the “primary 
factor,” “[it] is still only a factor and is not dispositive of whether the court will consid-
er the case equitably moot.”  Kuney, supra note 144, at 270.   
 According to the Second Circuit, the substantial-consummation factor will not 
make an appeal moot if   
(a) the court can still order some effective relief, (b) such relief will not affect 
the re-emergence of the debtor as a revitalized corporate entity, (c) such relief 
will not unravel intricate transactions so as to knock the props out from under 
the authorization for every transaction that has taken place and create an un-
manageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court, (d) the par-
ties who would be adversely affected by the modification have notice of the 
appeal and an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, and (e) the ap-
pellant pursue[d] with diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay of ex-
ecution of the objectionable order . . . if the failure to do so creates a situation 
rendering it inequitable to reverse the orders appealed from.  
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 952-53 (2d Cir. 
1993) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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equitable relief granted; and (4) the extent to which the relief requested 
on appeal would affect the interests of third parties.
162
  
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits combine the third and fourth factors, 
creating a three-part test.163  The Third Circuit, which has maintained 
that the doctrine “‘is limited in scope and should be cautiously ap-
plied,’”164 includes a fifth factor:  “the public policy of affording finali-
ty to bankruptcy judgments.”165  This addition is critical, as it will “most 
often militate toward a finding of equitable mootness, especially in 
larger and public company bankruptcies that affect the interests of 
many third parties.”166 
Although the differences in the tests are slight, the practical appli-
cation of equitable mootness still creates uncertainty.  As courts may 
fashion partial relief, it can be difficult to tell when mootness will  
occur.  For instance, while confirmation of a reorganization plan is 
typically considered final, a party may be released from liability if 
doing so would not upset the rest of the plan.167  The ambiguity sur-
rounding when equitable mootness should apply affects direct appeals 
and undermines Congress’s intent in instituting § 158(d)(2).  Al-
though a wise lawyer would request a stay when filing for certification 
of direct appeal, failure to do so (because of the uncertainty of moot-
ness) may prevent the court of appeals from hearing the merits of the 
case (and thus resolving a matter deemed to require clarification by 
the lower court).  In addition, the lower court could also simply deny 
the stay pending appeal, regardless of the threat of mootness.168 
B.  The Power of the Lower Courts:  To Grant or Deny a Stay 
Like so much in bankruptcy, there is uncertainty regarding the 
application of stays as well:  “Although the factors considered by 
courts in determining a stay pending appeal are fairly well-established, 
 
162 Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002). 
163 See Kuney, supra note 144, at 269-70 (citing In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 
F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2005), and In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994)) 
(analyzing the tests that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits adopted).   
164 Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting In re PWS Holding, 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
165 Id. 
166 Kuney, supra note 144, at 270. 
167 Id. 
168 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that lower courts are given 
this authority expressly by statute). 
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the application of those factors is far from uniform.”169  Stays are also 
often critical for review,170 which in turn is necessary to establish a 
predictable body of precedent. 
Bankruptcy Rule 8005 governs stays pending appeal.171  Although 
Rule 8005 requires that the request be made in the bankruptcy court 
first, it contains little guidance for what a party must do to receive a 
stay.172  Instead, courts have turned to the standard for granting pre-
liminary injunction motions and to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, which governs stays of district court orders by cir-
cuit courts.173  In general, courts analyze the following factors:   
(1) whether the movant is likely to succeed on appeal; (2) whether 
there is a risk to the movant of irreparable injury if a stay is denied; (3) 
whether (and to what extent) the other party will be harmed if a stay is 
granted; and (4) any public interest considerations.174  However, there 
is substantial disagreement about how these factors should be weighed, 
or if stays should only be granted if all four requirements are met.175 
In the context of § 158(d)(2), a strong argument could be made 
that a stay should be issued.  For direct appeals, it would be difficult to 
determine whether the movant would succeed on the appeal, as re-
quired by the first factor.  As noted earlier, courts of appeals usually 
authorize direct appeals to resolve uncertainty.  On direct appeal, re-
versals are more likely;176 therefore, lower courts may have more diffi-
culty estimating the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits.  Be-
cause review by the court of appeals is essential to the long-term aims 
of § 158(d)(2), one could also argue that creating certainty in the 
bankruptcy field is encompassed by the public interest factor. 
The second and third factors again highlight the tension in bank-
ruptcy appeals between the desire of one party to proceed quickly and 
the desire of others for review by an Article III court.  Note, however, 
that the threat of equitable mootness, according to some courts, con-
 
169 Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 143, at 557-58. 
170 See id. at 557 (“[T]he viability of appellate review of bankruptcy court orders is 
usually dependent upon the entry of a stay that preserves the status quo during the 
pendency of the appellate process.”). 
171 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005. 
172 See Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 143, at 558 (stating that Rule 8005 does not 
“set forth the standard that a party must satisfy to obtain a stay pending appeal”). 
173 See id. (describing the tests from which various courts have drawn). 
174 Id. at 559. 
175 See id. at 559-63 (summarizing the different approaches used by courts). 
176 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (explaining that there is a high 
rate of reversal on direct appeal). 
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stitutes an “irreparable injury” as mentioned in the second factor.177  
While the interaction between equitable mootness and irreparable 
harm is a matter of some debate (and admittedly, the majority of 
courts have determined mootness alone is not sufficient),178 one court 
recently found that “[t]he strong possibility of mootness based on 
substantial consummation of a bankruptcy plan means that absent a 
stay . . . many bankruptcy court confirmation orders will be immu-
nized from appellate review even if the remaining stay factors are satis-
fied.”179  Though fair treatment of other parties may still suggest that 
the court deny a stay, this must be weighed against the benefits of gua-
ranteeing that a matter, especially one worthy of certification for direct 
review, reach a court that is capable of crafting binding precedent. 
The Griggs rule does not remedy the problem.  In 1982, the Su-
preme Court determined in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. 
that “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional sig-
nificance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests 
the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved 
in the appeal.”180  Though courts have determined that Griggs applies 
to bankruptcy,181 it does not prevent a case from moving forward to 
the point where a decision by an appellate court could be “inequita-
ble.”  For instance, a reorganization plan like the one present in In re 
Chrysler is a final order that does not invoke the Griggs rule.182  The 
 
177 See, e.g., ACC Bondholder Grp. v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re Adelphia 
Commc’ns Corp.), 361 B.R. 337, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[W]here the denial of a stay 
pending appeal risks mooting any appeal of significant claims of error, the irreparable 
harm requirement is satisfied.”). 
178 See Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 143, at 561 (“A majority of courts have ruled that 
merely invoking equitable mootness is not sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm.”); 
see also Ball, supra note 155, at 95 (“Courts often grapple with the interplay of the doc-
trine of equitable mootness and the irreparable harm element of a stay analysis.  Both 
doctrines are seemingly intertwined, making definitive resolution of either difficult.”). 
179 In re Adelphia Commc’ns, 361 B.R. at 349 (emphasis added). 
180 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); see also Catherine Struve, Power, Protocol, and Practicality:  
Communications from the District Court During an Appeal, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 
2054 (2009) (discussing the application of the Griggs rule and the appropriate role of 
the district court after a notice of appeal has been filed). 
181 See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Transtexas Gas Corp. (In re 
Transtexas Gas Corp.), 303 F.3d 571, 579 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Griggs rule 
“applies with equal force to bankruptcy cases”); Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 
F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Trustee’s timely filing of its notice of appeal of 
the BAP’s decision to this court conferred jurisdiction on this court and divested both 
the BAP and the bankruptcy court of control over those aspects of the case involved in 
the appeal.”). 
182 Cf. In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1190 (“[T]he trial court . . . retains jurisdiction to 
implement or enforce the judgment or order . . . .”).  Note that postconfirmation ap-
FREEMAN_PRE_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  9:42 AM 
578 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 543 
lower court, in deciding the matter, has already completed all of its 
tasks and thus does not need to be “divested” of the right to act; the 
parties are still allowed to move forward with the plan.  By proceeding 
with the plan, one party may effectively moot the right of the other to 
request review by the court of appeals, thus undermining an opportu-
nity to create precedent.  This was the subject of a recent court of ap-
peals decision, In re Pacific Lumber Co.183 
 VII.  CASE STUDY:  IN RE PACIFIC LUMBER CO. 
In re Pacific Lumber Co. presents one example in which a lower 
court certified a matter for direct appeal while denying the party’s re-
lated motion for a stay pending that appeal.184  As such, it provides 
useful insights regarding the interaction between direct appeals and 
the equitable mootness doctrine.  While the Fifth Circuit was able to 
narrowly tailor the equitable mootness doctrine to review some (but 
not all) of the matters on direct appeal, this case highlights the poten-
tial threat to direct review by the courts of appeals, thus undermining 
the initial objectives of § 158(d)(2).  In re Pacific Lumber Co. also high-
lights that this situation likely will arise again, and thus decision-
makers should consider it as they craft the next set of rules to govern 
§ 158(d)(2).185 
In re Pacific Lumber Co. concerned a Chapter 11 reorganization 
plan for two timber companies in Northern California.186  After consi-
dering various proposals from the parties, the bankruptcy court con-
firmed a plan offered by Mendocino Redwood Company (MRC) and 
Marathon Structured Finance Fund (Marathon).  The plan allowed 
operations to continue under new ownership.187  The Bank of New 
York Trust Company, as the “Indenture Trustee” representing secured 
bondholders, filed a request for certification for direct appeal and a 
motion to stay the confirmation plan pending appeal.188  Although the 
 
peals are “the context in which the doctrine [of equitable mootness] most often aris-
es.”  Murphy, supra note 12, at 38.   
183 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
184 Id. at 229-30. 
185 In fact, the issue has already arisen again in the Fifth Circuit.  See supra note 142 
(discussing In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc., 591 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
186 In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 229. 
187 Id. at 237. 
188 Id. at 239.  “The Indenture Trustee asserted on appeal contentions of three 
types:  those challenging the treatment of their security interests; those challenging the 
plea confirmation procedures; and those relating to other specific plan terms.”  Id. 
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bankruptcy court granted the request for a direct appeal, it refused to 
issue the stay.189  Instead, the bankruptcy court granted the Bank of 
New York a ten-day stay to request relief from the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.190  The motions panel of the circuit court also denied the 
stay pending appeal.191  As a result, within sixty days (the time allowed 
to request a certification for direct appeal), the two timber companies 
were dissolved and their assets transferred to new entities.192 
By the time the matter reached the court of appeals,193 the Fifth 
Circuit was forced to consider whether the doctrine of equitable 
mootness prevented it from hearing the appeal.  In its analysis, the 
court was careful to assess the impact of § 158(d)(2), as well as Con-
gress’s intent for that provision.194  The Fifth Circuit warned that 
“Congress’s purpose may be thwarted if equitable mootness is used to 
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over a properly certified 
appeal.”195  Although the bankruptcy court’s actions (certifying the di-
rect appeal without granting the stay pending appeal) appeared in-
consistent, the court of appeals recognized that the lower court was 
merely trying to balance two often incompatible aims—preserving the 
right to review while also hastening a proceeding towards its final con-
clusion.196  Still, the court ultimately suggested that review by the court 
of appeals and the opportunity to create meaningful precedent 
should have been prioritized: 
Although the exigencies of the case appeared to demand prompt action, 
simply denying a stay seems to have been, and often will be, too simplis-
tic a response.  A plan may be designed to take effect . . . after a lapse of 
sufficient time to initiate appellate review.  A supersedeas bond may be 
tailored to the scope of the appeal.  An appeal may be expedited.  As 
with all facets of bankruptcy practice, myriad possibilities exist.  Thus, 
substantial legal issues can and ought to be preserved for review.
197
 
 
189 Id. 
190 In re Scotia Dev., LLC, 2008 WL 2811479, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2008). 
191 In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 239. 
192 Id. at 242.   
193 Chief Judge Edith Jones, whose article is cited earlier in this Comment, wrote 
the majority opinion.  Cf. supra notes 16, 35 and accompanying text (citing an article 
by Chief Judge Jones recognizing the need to move quickly in bankruptcy proceedings 
and the need for flexibility in permitting appeals). 
194 The court noted that “[t]he twin purposes of the provision were to expedite ap-
peals in significant cases and to generate binding appellate precedent in bankruptcy, 
whose caselaw has been plagued by indeterminacy.”  In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 241-42. 
195 Id. at 242. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 243. 
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This warning provides useful guidance for courts to bear in mind 
when similar situations arise in the future. 
In its resolution of the case, the court decided that equitable 
mootness did not prevent it from considering the treatment of the 
noteholders’ secured claims.198  Although the court of appeals ulti-
mately determined that the bankruptcy court had decided correctly, 
the court of appeals suggested that if it had reversed, “adverse appel-
late consequences were foreseeable to [MRC/Marathon] as sophisti-
cated investors who opted to press the limits of bankruptcy confirma-
tion and valuation rules.”199  The court also felt empowered to 
examine the legality of the nondebtor exculpation and release 
clause.200  The clause was intended to shield the parties that took on 
the debt of the two original timber companies from any negligence 
that occurred during the bankruptcy.201  The court determined that 
the clause “must be struck except with respect to the Creditors Com-
mittee and its members,”202 which did not impact anything except po-
tential future litigation.  Finally, the court remanded an issue of unpaid 
intercompany administrative priority claims.203  The court noted that it 
was entitled to do so “[b]ecause awarding relief on the full $11 million 
would seem not to imperil a reorganization involving hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.”204 
The Fifth Circuit also found that it was barred from considering 
some matters.  The court simply dismissed the substantial-consideration 
claim as “easily disposed of” and thus did not even address whether 
the claims were moot.205  The court did not adjudicate two other is-
sues, one regarding the artificial impairment of a class of claims and 
the other involving the gerrymandering of two classes of unsecured 
claims.  Though the court noted that these decisions were “even more 
troubling” and that “[t]he bankruptcy court’s findings that Class 8 
claims are necessary to sustain the reorganization are odd,” the court 
was forced to dismiss the appeals due to the doctrine of equitable 
mootness.206 
 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 244. 
200 See id. at 251-52 (deciding that the equitable mootness doctrine did not apply 
and considering the issue on its merits). 
201 See id. at 252 (discussing the intent of the release clause). 
202 Id. at 253. 
203 Id. at 250. 
204 Id.  
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 251. 
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This case should stand as a warning about the power of the doc-
trine of equitable mootness to undermine the policies behind direct 
appeals.  Although the Fifth Circuit, in this instance, was able to “ap-
ply equitable mootness with a scalpel rather than an axe,”207 courts of 
appeals in the future could be barred from addressing claims critical 
enough to warrant direct appeal.  Therefore, lower courts, practition-
ers, and rulemakers should consider the value of stays in concert with 
direct appeals to establish predictable precedent in bankruptcy law 
and achieve the long-term aims of § 158(d)(2). 
VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the wake of the financial crisis, it is especially important that 
procedures are in place to ensure that individuals and corporations 
can move forward.  Without the appropriate precedents, bankruptcy 
law will continue to be confusing and unpredictable.  Direct appeals 
provide one important procedural mechanism to expedite bankruptcy 
appeals.  However, In re Pacific Lumber Co. illustrates how the freedom 
of the lower courts to grant or deny stays pending appeal has the po-
tential to undermine the aims of Congress, erring too heavily in favor 
of efficiency while jeopardizing concerns of equity.  In light of the 
threat of the doctrine of equitable mootness, the current incarnation 
of § 158(d)(2) does not adequately protect individual appellants’ 
right to Article III review.  In addition, despite evidence that courts of 
appeals have granted direct appeals in the instances Congress im-
agined, failure to grant a stay pending appeal may prevent a matter 
worthy of direct review from reaching a court capable of crafting bind-
ing precedent.  As rulemakers and practitioners reconsider where to 
strike the balance between speed and the opportunity for meaningful 
review in bankruptcy appeals, the authority to grant or deny stays pend-
ing direct appeal must be at the forefront of the debate. 
This Comment recommends that an automatic ten-day stay be 
granted to allow the courts of appeals the opportunity to conduct an 
initial review to determine whether equitable mootness is a concern.208  
If the circuit court finds that an issue deemed worthy of review in the 
lower court’s certification of the direct appeal could be moot without 
judicial intervention, the court of appeals should issue its own stay 
 
207 Id. at 240; see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 44 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s 
“restrictive” application of the equitable mootness doctrine in In re Pacific Lumber Co.). 
208 Notably, the motions panel in In re Pacific Lumber Co. rejected a ten-day stay, 
though it did not provide the reasons for this decision.  In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 236.   
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pending appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8017(c).209  Arguably, this  
solution may slow down individual bankruptcy proceedings.  However, 
current timing provisions in the Bankruptcy Rules could be altered to 
mitigate this.  For instance, the time for parties to petition the circuit 
court for permission to appeal could once again be shortened from 
thirty days to ten days.210  As no reason has been given for increasing 
the time period211 and the time limitation for interlocutory appeals 
under § 1292(b) remains at ten days,212 this provision should be rewrit-
ten to reflect the urgency of most bankruptcy proceedings. 
Although this Comment has focused on the interplay between stays 
and the doctrine of equitable mootness, rulemakers and courts should 
consider other ways to balance efficiency and the need for meaningful 
review by an Article III court.  In In re Pacific Lumber Co., the court rec-
ommended setting a later date for the reorganization plan to take ef-
fect, allowing sufficient time for appellate review.213  In addition, a court 
could order an appeal to be expedited, as evidenced by the June 5, 
2009, decision by the Second Circuit in In re Chrysler.214  Finally, courts 
could reevaluate the doctrine of equitable mootness; for instance, 
courts could embrace a “restrictive” interpretation of the doctrine akin 
to that articulated by the Fifth Circuit in In re Pacific Lumber Co.215  This 
conception of the doctrine would favor “protecting an appellant’s right 
to adjudication except in those exceptional circumstances where the 
effects of the appeal will derail a confirmed plan.”216 
As the rulemakers continue to consider changes to the Appellate 
Rules and the Bankruptcy Rules, the lessons of direct appeals are par-
ticularly salient.  This Comment adds to the discussion of ways in 
which bankruptcy procedure in general, and § 158(d)(2) in particu-
lar, may be crafted to balance the competing aims of efficiency versus 
fairness and the urgency of proceedings versus the right to review.  
 
209 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8017(c) (“This rule does not limit the power of a court of 
appeals . . . to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal . . . .”). 
210 Cf. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(5).  
211 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that the minutes from the 
Bankruptcy Conference do not explain the increase to thirty days). 
212 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
213 See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 243 (“A plan may be designed to take ef-
fect . . . after a lapse of sufficient time to initiate appellate review.”). 
214 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (summarizing the In re Chrysler pro-
ceedings). 
215 See Murphy, supra note 12, at 44 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit articulated a 
more “restrictive interpretation”). 
216 Id. at 47. 
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Ongoing study of the use of direct appeals within the bankruptcy con-
text is warranted, especially as the number of such cases continues to 
increase in each circuit.  For now, as the Advisory Committee on 
Bankruptcy Rules and the Appellate Rules Committee consider the 
direct appeals procedure, it is important that the concerns mentioned 
in this Comment—the value of Article III review, stays, timing, and the 
threat of mootness—remain central to all future conversations. 
 
